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ABSTRACT 
This analysis builds on the evidence that Pakistani banks (as of June 2017) have sufficient 
financial resources to lend at levels that would be helpful for SMEs at large. Channelization of 
this excess banking liquidity to SMEs can lead to investment in innovative and lucrative projects 
to stimulate employment and growth in a number of important industries. However, banks are 
found reluctant to finance to SMEs owing the opacity issues and related risk. Mitigation of this 
problem nonetheless demands that banks should take leaps in adopting progressive/modern 
lending techniques (which bode well for the modern financing needs of SMEs) banks (without 
compromising on risk and return) can more adequately address SME credit constraints. 
Keywords: Opacity issues; Banks’ lending behavior; SMEs; Modern financing. 
JEL Classification: D81; G24; L11; G32 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Bottlenecks associated with financing of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) is a topic which 
has gained vital interest of central bankers around the globe. The conceptual framework to which 
most of the contemporary research adheres has been quite helpful in understanding the 
institutions and markets that provide funds to SMEs. It has also provided insights into the effects 
of policies that affect access of credit to SMEs. SME credit is seen risky by lenders in general, 
which results in less product innovation for the segment. Particularly in developing countries, 
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banks lack motivation to opt for innovative lending techniques required to serve the under- or 
un-served SMEs.  Although literature shows that innovation in lending techniques can prove 
vital to boost SME financing. This write-up asserts that even in Pakistan, adoption of progressive 
techniques can redeem the banking sector confidence via mitigation of the opacity issues 
associated with SMEs countrywide. 
In Pakistan, SMEs constitute about 90 percent of businesses and employ around 80 percent of the 
non-agricultural labor. SMEs contribute more than 40 percent in the annual GDP and around 27 
percent in total exports (Saleem, 2008 and Dar et al., 2017). Owing to significant diversification 
countrywide, SMEs are also the outsourcing hubs of large corporations. If SMEs are engines to 
growth, then credit is the lifeline of SMEs, but unfortunately, overtime (FY-05 to FY-17) the 
significant unbundling in the banks’ SME lending has undermined their growth. 
Formal financing to SMEs has remained low due to limited access and understanding of financial 
products. Besides lack of collateral, most of the SMEs don’t possess necessary documentation to 
get credit. As largely banks are not willing to take exposure because SMEs don’t have a credit 
history. The lenders have developed strong obsession with collateralized lending that leaves little 
space for improvement in existing lending techniques. However, over the past decade, market 
regulators are striving hard to boost up SME financing to make these enterprises growth engines. 
Accordingly, various policy interventions have been carried on in the past to incentivize banks 
for SME lending. These include: improved regulatory framework, credit guarantee schemes, 
mark-up subsidy, risk coverage schemes and annual SME lending targets. Despite all these 
efforts, SME credit remains low, and this problem can partially be attributes to lack of product 
innovation on part of banks. 
Even though banks remain obsessed with collateralized lending
1
, SMEs credit constraints can be 
addressed through heterogeneous transactions lending techniques which include: (i) financial 
statement lending; (ii) asset-based lending; (iii) factoring; (iv) fixed-asset lending; (v) small 
business credit scoring; (vi) leasing; and (vii) agent-based lending. Except financial statement 
lending, other techniques can be vital to target opaque and tyro SMEs. In addition to transactions 
lending, other techniques (based on qualitative/soft information) can also systematically 
overcome the opacity issues particularly associated with SMEs. These include: relationship 
lending and agent-based lending. This way, sustained availability of credit can make SMEs 
engines to economic growth by enabling them to invest in innovative and high return projects 
that can drive employment and growth in a number of important industries countrywide. 
Furthermore, SMEs’ opacity issues can be minimized via improving and making public the 
existing e-CIB
2
 data available with the central bank. It can provide more leverage to private 
credit bureaus
3
 in terms of precision of their credit ratings. 
                                                          
1 Historically about 98 percent of private sector credit has been targeted through collateralized lending. 
2 The Electronic Credit Information Bureau (e-CIB) was established with the State Bank of Pakistan in 1992. Ever since its inception, e-CIB has 
been playing a pivotal role in gathering, organizing and disseminating critical information relating to credit-worthiness of borrowers to assist 
financial institutions in their lending decisions and averting the occurrence of default. Existing e-CIB system has been designed in line with best 
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Banking Preferences and Formal Financing to SMEs 
Although, interest rates are at historic low (end June 2017), credit to private sector is not picking 
up with the required acceleration. Overtime, private sector credit as a percentage of GDP has 
followed a declining trajectory as shown in Figure 1(d). At present, it is hovering around 16 
percent that is lower even if compared to other emerging market economies of the region (for 
more explanation, see Khalid & Nadeem, 2017)
4
. This shows that banks are inefficiently 
channelizing credit to private sector, out of which SME financing is a small fraction (SME credit 
has dropped from 17 percent of private sector credit in FY-05 to only 8 percent in FY-17). 
Historically, banks have been deploying saving deposits to maximum banking spread
5
, as shown 
in Figure 1 (b). Banking spread in Pakistan has remained higher even in comparison to other  
emerging market economies (Khalid & Nadeem, 2017). As extraordinary banking spread can 
possibly lower the competition and efficiency in the banking sector. In order to discourage this 
practice, the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) has followed a narrow interest rate corridor regime 
since 2009. Banks are now left with fewer options that can yield windfall gains i.e. spread 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
international credit sharing practices around the world. The e-CIB database is capturing more than 4 million borrowers’ records collected and 
submitted by about 100 member financial institutions. 
3 In Pakistan there are four privately owned and managed credit bureaus that facilitate lenders with credit information to screen and monitor 
borrowers. These are: 1) Datacheck (Pvt.) Limited, 2) News-VIS Credit Information Services (Pvt.) Limited, 3) ICIL/ PakBizInfo and 4) Credit 
Chex (Pvt.) Limited. 
4 The private sector credit growth in Pakistan appears to have deteriorated over time. 
5 Bank spread is the simple difference between the prevailing weighted average borrowing rate and weighted average lending rate at commercial 
banks. 
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(d) Depth of Banking Sector  in Pakistan
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(c) SME NPLs Vs Industry NPLs 
Source: State Bank of Pakistan
After FY-08, SME NPLs grew 
more  than overall NPLs.
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Figure 1 (a): Banking Liquidity in Pakistan
Banks have excess 
liquidity − gap is on rise
0
3
6
9
12
0
20
40
60
80
F
Y
0
0
F
Y
0
1
F
Y
0
2
F
Y
0
3
F
Y
0
4
F
Y
0
5
F
Y
0
6
F
Y
0
7
F
Y
0
8
F
Y
0
9
F
Y
1
0
F
Y
1
1
F
Y
1
2
F
Y
1
3
F
Y
1
4
F
Y
1
5
F
Y
1
6
F
Y
1
7
Cost/Income ROE ROA (RHS) Banking Spread (RHS)
p
e
rc
e
n
t
p
e
rc
e
n
t
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maximization.
6
 They can neither cut-down structural/operational costs nor can they earn enough 
by lending to risk averse avenues.
7
 All these circumstances provide justification for banks to 
endeavor in SME lending. 
In Pakistan, banks’ prime function is cost minimization. To meet this end, banks either engage 
with big corporates or prefer sovereign lending. By going into risk free ventures, banks are trying 
to avoid rather than managing various risks.
8
 This risk averse behavior is although against the 
banking spirit, but banks find sovereign lending more convenient against lending to private 
sector where efforts are required to monitor and assess associated risks. However, this behavior 
defies the basic cause of existence of banking establishments i.e. by default, they should manage 
risk rather than avoiding it. Owing to availability of risk free lending avenues, commercial banks 
have attained cost efficiency at the expense of inclusivity.
9
 
In recent years (particularly after FY-08), trend of banking deposits to GDP ratio has remained 
stable, whereas private sector advances to GDP is slightly declining (Figure 1d). However, the 
overall supply of credit (to public plus private sector) has considerably improved by the banks. 
So, less credit being supplied to private sector (or to SMEs) means either banks are facing 
challenges at channelization front or they are deliberately shying away from SME lending. Later 
phenomenon has been more apparent in recent decade (FY-08 to FY-17). Banking credit has 
been highly skewed towards sovereign lending and/or banks are mostly serving the borrowing 
needs of the already existing corporate client. After FY-08, commercial banks’ investments have 
been more bulged towards government treasury bills as they are facing obvious trade-off 
between risk and return especially in the wake of prolonged accommodative monetary policy 
                                                          
6 If one looks at the balance sheet of commercial banks; a significant portion of deposits is composed of demand deposits, historically it is been 
about 80 percent if taken as a percentage share of total deposits. With all due good reasons, these deposits come at negligible price on the end of 
commercial banks i.e. just maintenance and operational facilities to current account holders. In order to remain liquid commercial banks can’t 
deploy demand deposits for long-term i.e. either private lending or PIBs. Most lucrative option left with commercial banks is to invest these funds 
in short-term, secure and less costly avenues i.e. MTBs. That’s why; banks are deploying these funds by investing in MTBs and/or playing in 
money market for gains over shorter periods. Since November 2013, SBP has followed accommodative monetary policy in order to benefit from 
lower inflation as growth stimulation has overridden the inflation targeting objective. This shrinking spread has resulted in negligible roll-over of 
long-term sovereign lending i.e. PIBs. Furthermore, stringent regulatory requirements also restrict banks to lend to opaque enterprises in private 
sector. 
7 As owing to low markup, growing industrial competition does not allow them to lower down salaries of managing staff or to restrain from 
opting for technological advancements that include the expenses on customized banking software suits. 
8 These various risks are credit risk, default risk, market risk and interest rate risk etc. 
9 Over the horizon, financial sector has gained cost efficiency at the expense of financial inclusion. As the most vulnerable segment (SMEs and 
small & rural enterprises) largely remain excluded from the financial sector. 
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Figure 2 (a): Banks  Lending Preferences
Source: State Bank of Pakistan
Prior FY-08, Private Sector Lending sloped − 
steeper and Sovereign Lending sloped − flatter
However, after FY-08 situation is reversed.
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 that has been adopted by SBP in order to stimulate growth and benefit from lower inflation. 
After heavily investing in MTBs, relatively smaller split of advances is left for private sector 
(Figure 2a), which is to be served to a handful of industries at the expense of financial inclusion 
at large; which further adds to the financing problems of SMEs. 
As shown in Figure 2(a), banks have been strongly obsessed with collateralized lending which 
often excludes new but potentially innovative borrowers. About 97 percent of lending to private 
sector in Pakistan is collateral based. Furthermore, stringent documentation and evaluation 
requirements limit timely and affordable credit to SMEs. Rather than serving small loans to 
various customers, banks prefer to lend few big loans to corporate entities easily meeting lending 
requirements i.e. easily assessable good quality collateral. This way, banks keep on saving on 
monitoring and operational costs by rendering SMEs under-served at large. By saving on 
transaction and monitoring costs, banks have ended up with cost efficiency where financial 
inclusion i.e. the equitable channelization of credit has remained a wild goose chase. 
Figure 2(b) indicates the robust regulatory framework which although has brought efficiency (as 
actual CAR has been far greater than required) in the banking industry but it has also been one of 
the reasons of lower private sector credit to GDP (a compromise on the equity side). As banks 
have to maintain additional liquidity as a preemptive measure to meet the proposed regulations. 
In pursuit of compliance to regulations, banks have reluctantly gained excess liquidity as 
revealed by actually higher than required capital adequacy ratio (CAR). Under BASEL-I, capital 
charge for market risk was effectively imposed in December 2004 whereas, a roadmap for 
BASEL-II was announced in March 2005; and further instructions on CAR were issued in June 
2006. From January 2008, BASEL-II was implemented in full essence and a standardized 
approach was adopted for credit- and operational-risk. Instructions on BASEL-III were issued in 
August 2013, after which under compliance status as of June 2017, minimum requirement of 
CAR was increased from 10 percent to 10.65 percent. Furthermore, as part of the ongoing phased 
implementation plan, CAR requirements and capital conservation buffers are to be gradually 
raised to 12.5 percent by the end of December 2019. In addition, from August 2009, SBP has 
followed a narrow interest rate corridor regime which has resulted in contraction of banking 
spread. Rigorous regulatory requirements impose an implicit taxation on banking sector and 
further constrain the SME credit. As from FY-09 onward, banks are continuously shedding on 
profitability grounds (Figure 1b). 
INDIGENOUS EXPERIENCE OF SMES 
SMEs have strong association with both formal and informal sectors. At times of distress, they 
are more resilient owing to backward- and forward-linkages and concentration of industry 
specific SMEs in a typical geographic jurisdiction. On the flip side, this resilience is also the 
result of hereditary businesses, labor intensive production techniques, poor management 
practices, and lack of innovations. Lack of adequate financing facilities instigates SMEs 
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vulnerability to external shocks particularly at financial fronts (refer to low financing; low 
productivity; and low revenue trap). Unfortunately, overtime (FY-05 to FY-17) the significant 
unbundling in the banks’ SME lending has undermined their growth. During this span, SME 
credit has gone through significant changes i.e. declining from about 17 percent of private sector 
credit in FY-05 to mere 8 percent in FY-17. The indigenous experience of SME financing can be 
divided into three phases − explained below. 
Phase-I: Pre FY-08 
Until FY-08, in the hindsight of a huge influx of liquidity, the banking sector took leaps and 
significantly expanded the services suit offered to SMEs besides aggressively venturing in other 
non-conventional areas − the consumer finance. In the presence of the government’s subdued 
appetite for budgetary funding, banks appeared desperate to park their funds with private sector, 
especially the SMEs. Around this period, easy monetary policy also ensured incentive to SMEs 
to borrow credit from banking channel. This resulted in heating-up of credit demand; increasing 
SME financing as a percentage share of private sector credit to about 17 percent in FY-05 (all 
time high as reported in Figure 3a). Overall, this phase was marked with enabling environment 
for healthy growth of private sector credit where SMEs were quite benefiting from all extended 
favorable factors. 
Phase-II: FY-08 to FY-14 
Things began to change course from 2008 onwards, following the deterioration in the overall 
macroeconomic and investment climate globally that brought commodity prices slump. Not only 
did the global financial crisis (GFC) triggered a sense of uncertainty, but also the growing 
security concerns, political instability and energy shortages in the country significantly dented 
domestic business prospects by wiping out the enabling environment and slacking the confidence 
of economic agents at large. Banking sector profitability squeezed, as average return on assets 
decreased from 2.3 (during FY-02 to FY-07) to 1.4 (during FY-08 to FY-14). SMEs also 
witnessed a sharp increase in NPLs, which mounted from average 12 percent (pre FY-08 period) 
to 30 percent of outstanding SME lending during this span; lowering the average SME credit to 
mere 7.65 percent of the overall private sector credit from FY-09 to FY-14 (Figure 3d). During 
this period, double-digit interest rates also undermined to SME credit growth. 
International Journal of Advanced Economics, Ilyas, pp. 18-30 Page 24 
 
Subsequent to almost half decade of continuous war on terror, financial inflows also become 
bleak. To end broadly looming uncertainty, counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies could not 
be deployed as vulnerabilities in the external sector morphed into a full-blown balance of 
payments crisis in FY-08. For the following 5 years, interest rates remained in double-digits 
contributing to an anemic SME credit growth. In this period, crowding out of SME sector 
occurred as political instability and conduct of general elections (in 2008) increased government 
borrowing from financial sector. 
Phase-III: Post FY-14 
In the post FY-14 period, as the recessionary shocks of global meltdown are almost fading away, 
banks are gradually taking exposure in SME financing. Although, the average SME credit to 
private sector credit has remained at 7.86 percent, but rising aggregate demand and presence of 
fairly accommodative monetary policy will result some improvements in SME credit takeoff 
going forward. For the most part, improving macroeconomic environment also indicates future 
prospects for SMEs as the SBP is spearheading commendable efforts in this regard. 
If articulated by the Large Scale Manufacturing (LSM), businesses are expanding at a 
considerable pace and going forward they would need financing to keep it up.
10
 In the wake of 
                                                          
10 In FY-17, LSM posted a ten-year high growth of 5.7 percent. However, large imbalances at external front and extending skirmishes at political 
front can be injurious to macroeconomic stability down the road. Which resultantly can disturb the smooth and sustained credit availability to 
SMEs. 
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Figure 3 (a): SME Outstanding  Vs Industry Outstanding Finance
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Source: State Bank of Pakistan
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accommodative monetary policy, SMEs are in better position to borrow for much needed BMR
11
 
requirements besides working capital. However, they are still struggling despite improved 
aggregated demand contributing to consumption led growth.
12
 This slowdown in SME credit 
growth is perhaps due to banks’ skepticism developed in Phase-II. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table (1) clearly shows that SME lending is relatively more profitable as compared to other 
avenues available with banks. However, it is obviously one of the riskier venture; given the 
current SME lending portfolio. This means, appropriate risk assessment can prove vital for more 
credit availability to SME sector. Moreover, given the ongoing favorable environment, SME 
lending is likely to pick-up. As, economic activity is improving; lending rates are at historic low. 
Businesses are reaping handsome profits owing to multiple price revisions, better aggregate 
demand and improved global commodity prices.
13
 The economy is likely to observe further 
expansion in the wake of ongoing CPEC related projects.
14
 Down the road, power outages are 
likely to end owing to completion of various mega projects undertaken by the public and/ or 
private sector. In the wake of these positive developments, perhaps the banks will gradually 
change their game regarding credit injections to potential SMEs. As banks can benefit by 
venturing in SME lending, one way to grease these engines of economic growth is to improve 
the existing lending techniques and opt for modern lending practices that are beyond 
collateralized lending. 
HOW TO GREASE THE GROWTH ENGINES? 
Even if banks have comfort with collateralized lending, adoption of progressive lending 
techniques can still enhance the SME credit. This simply involves improvement in existing 
lending techniques besides, adoption of qualitative techniques. These techniques, if employed, 
                                                          
11 BMR stands for balancing, modernization and replacement. It usually refers to efficiency enhancement of business entities. 
12 In FY-17 growth (5.3 percent) major driving force was consumption. Largely Pakistan remains a consumption-oriented society, where marginal 
propensity to consume (MPC) remains highest. Referred to Khan et al., 2015 long-term MPC in Pakistan is 0.82 that is greater than that of India 
(0.72), and Bangladesh (0.75). 
13 In Pakistan, the median number of price changes is three times of what is found in developed world (details are available in Ali et al., 2016). 
14 China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is a collection of about 52 infrastructure development projects under public-private partnership. Current net 
worth of projects under CPEC is 62 billion of US dollar. 
Table 1 
Sectoral Weighted Average  Lending Rate 
(WALR) of Banks 
S.# Sector 
WALR  
(Jun-17) 
1 Government 
6.7 
7.0 
12.4 
14.7
* 
2 
Corporate 
Commercial 
3 Agriculture 
4 
SME/Consumer 
Finance 
Source: State Bank of Pakistan 
*authors’ calculation 
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can serve the borrowing needs of underserved SMEs. In addition, as information and 
communication technology (ICT) is swiftly growing up. Acquiring soft information has become 
easy. In Pakistan, significant penetration of smart phone and usage of mobile internet has 
resulted in social networking through various applications (facebook, whatsapp, twitter, linkedIn 
and Instagram etc.), which in near future can be taped to promote qualitative lending. These 
progressive lending techniques are explained below: 
Financial Statement Lending 
Financial statement lending is a transactions technique under which lending decisions are 
primarily based on the soundness (reliability plus strength) of a borrower’s financial statements. 
It purely relies on hard information that is subjected to two conditions; as per necessary 
condition: the borrower should have informative financial statements audited by some reputed 
accounting firm based on generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP); and according to 
sufficient condition: these financial statements must reflect strong financial position easily 
calculated from financial ratios. Through scrutiny of quantitative information, lender can 
effectively assess the expected future cash flows of targeted SMEs as being the primary source 
of repayment of loan. In Pakistan, it is interesting to know that in top ten SME sectors more than 
80 percent of firms prepare financial statements but none get these audited.
15
 It necessitates 
sound financial reporting as per standard practices that can play a vital role in improving the 
credit availability from formal sector to SMEs. 
Asset-based Lending 
Asset-based lending focuses on the quality of assets (principally accounts receivable and 
inventory) of SMEs, which are (being the primary source of repayment) pledged as collateral 
with the bank.
16
 This way, even opaque SMEs can meet their working capital requirements. The 
amount of credit extended through asset-based lending is systematically linked with the net 
market worth of assets pledged with the lending bank. This requires appropriate assessment of 
collateral over continuous intervals, i.e. daily in the case of accounts receivable, and weekly or 
monthly for inventory. Over each assessment period, banks assure that the liquidation value 
(simply the net market worth) of the collateral must exceed the credit exposure taken (Berger & 
Udell, 2006). Asset-based lending can be quite successful in case of Pakistan where, around 70 
percent of the SME borrowing needs are related to working capital. It will also provide 
borrowing opportunity to people who desist traditional loans owing to religious reasons. 
Factoring 
Factoring involves the purchase of accounts receivable by the lender called factor. Similar to 
asset-based lending, factoring also focuses on the net value of an underlying asset, rather than the 
                                                          
15 International Finance Corporation (IFC) in liaison with State Bank of Pakistan mandated Grant Thornton Pakistan to conduct a primary survey 
of businesses within the top ten SME sectors/subsectors of Pakistan in 2010 to determine banking and financial needs of these sectors. 
16 The pledging of accounts receivable or inventory does not distinguish asset-based lending from the other lending techniques that can also 
involve collateralized lending. For example, financial statement lending, relationship lending, and credit scoring etc., where collateral is used as 
secondary source of repayment whereas, under asset-based lending the extension of credit is based on the net market worth of the collateral, 
rather than the overall creditworthiness of borrowing SME. 
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overall value/ risk of the firm. However, it involves the financing of accounts receivable, where 
the underlying asset is sold to the lender. It is essentially a bundle of three financial services: a 
financing component, a credit component and a collections component. Under most factoring 
arrangements, the borrower outsources its credit and collections activities in addition to 
obtaining financing. Factoring can effectively address the opacity problem by focusing primarily 
on the quality of the obligor, rather than the owner and/or SME.
17
 It can be a successful trade 
finance facility in Pakistan. 
Fixed-asset Lending 
Fixed-asset lending focuses on assets that are long-lived and are not sold in the normal course of 
business (e.g. machinery, building and land). Under fixed-asset lending the underlying assets are 
pledged to the lender as collateral. However, the pledged assets under fixed-asset lending are 
exclusively identifiable. The long life and unique identification of fixed assets leads to very 
different underwriting procedures, contract structures, and monitoring mechanisms. The contract 
structure specifies an initial loan-to-value ratio less than unity. It also involves setting a loan 
amortization schedule with a final maturity less than the estimated lifespan of the asset. This 
contract structure also feeds back to the underwriting process, where the primary financial 
analysis focuses on coverage ratios that measure a firm’s ability to meet the amortization 
schedule (i.e., debt servicing). Owing to easy monitoring, fixed-asset lending is one of the easiest 
ways to finance the SMEs, which do not bear any credit history.
18
 Currently, it is the most 
common facility for SME financing in Pakistan. 
Leasing 
Leasing involves the purchase of fixed assets by the lender: known as a lessor. Leasing is a very 
common practice used by banks to finance for equipment, motor vehicles, and real estate in 
many countries. The lessor purchases the fixed assets and then simultaneously enters into a rental 
contract with the lessee that specifies the payment schedule. The contract often contains an 
option whereby the lessee can purchase the assets at the end. Leasing can effectively overcome 
the opacity issues attached with SMEs because the underwriting decision is primarily based on 
the value of the asset being leased.
19
 It has been very successful in Pakistan − in particular 
reference to financing the consumer durables. 
Small Business Credit Scoring 
Small business credit scoring is also a transactions technique based primarily on hard 
information about the SME and its owner. The owner specific information is primarily personal 
                                                          
17 The use of factoring varies widely across countries. For example, the ratio of the volume of factoring to GDP in 2002 was 11.9 percent in Italy, 
but only 0.9 percent in Switzerland (Berger & Udell, 2004). 
18 Unlike monitoring asset-based loans, the monitoring of collateral (i.e. ownership of collateral by the borrower) is not problematic in fixed-asset 
lending. The borrower can only sell a fixed asset by transfer of title, which can only occur if the lender agrees to release the lien. Monitoring the 
borrower’s ability to pay (i.e. its cash flows) is tied to the observation of timely repayment as specified by the amortization schedule. Failure to 
meet a required payment signals inadequate cash flow and triggers default risk on the loan. 
19 Leasing can mitigate an adverse selection problem, either in the used equipment market by encouraging a higher quality of product sold or off-
lease (i.e. sold by lessors when the purchase option is not exercised) or in the new product market (for more details visit Gilligan, 2004). 
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consumer data obtained from consumer credit bureaus (e-CIB data in case of Pakistan). Data 
dissemination to privately owned credit bureaus helps them in determining the credit rating of 
various borrowers that facilitate lenders to screen and monitor a particular loan applicant. This 
combined with data on the SME (collected by the financial institutions) is then entered into a 
loan performance prediction model, which yields a score to determine the approval or 
disapproval of loan application.
20
 Besides default levels, existence of credit bureaus also reduces 
the cost and time to process loan application (Miller, 2003). Credit ratings can be vital to finance 
SMEs based on their projected sales or future cash flows. 
What Lies Beyond Transactions Lending? 
Relationship Lending 
Relationship lending can specifically be targeted to SMEs to address their opacity issues, as the 
financial institutions rely primarily on soft information gathered over time through interactions 
with an SME, its owner and the local community or industry under which a business operates. 
This information is largely acquired by the loan officer through direct contacts with the borrower 
and by observing the SME’s performance on all dimensions of its banking relationship. By 
acquiring this soft information, the banks can make an assessment of the future prospects of 
SMEs based on past communication with SMEs, their customers, suppliers, or the industry peers. 
Previously, preservation of this soft information was difficult as this may often remain 
proprietary to the loan officer because it is not easily observed, verified, or transmitted to others 
(Degryse & Van Cayseele, 2000). Despite being a potential product for SME financing, 
relationship lending remains untapped due to banker-borrower divide in Pakistan.  
Agent-based Lending 
A pervasive concern faced by the banks is careful risk evaluation of the SMEs aiming to design 
their sector specific market strategies. However, owing to opacity issues, banks found SME 
lending the riskiest venture. Agent-based lending can overcome this problem via mitigation of 
risk factor primarily associated with such financing. This kind of lending can raise the 
confidence of banking sector while lending to SMEs as, this requires a third party for evaluation, 
monitoring and loan payback. This way, banks can save on evaluation and monitoring costs by 
outsourcing such activities to their agents who also bear the prime liability in most of the cases. 
However, agents only help in evaluation and monitoring whereas, repayment liability lies with 
the borrower. In recent years, various organizations are running randomized control trails to 
gauge the success of agent-based lending in Pakistan.   
 
                                                          
20 Across the globe, small business credit scoring models are being widely relied to target opaque SMEs for a range of credit requirements, 
normally small amount loans that are rated as relatively riskier, but bear high interest rates, and are often located outside of the banks’ local 
markets (Frame & Woosley, 2004). This technique is relatively new in the sense that it was not generally used in the United States until the mid-
1990s (Berger & Udell, 2006). In US, most banks use external vendors to create the scores, and these vendors rely on credit bureaus that share 
consumer and business information and financial institutions to share their loan performance data to estimate the model (Miller & Rojas, 2004). 
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Keeping in view the banking liquidity situation, especially after FY-14, it can be inferred that 
banks have sufficient resources to lend at levels that would help SMEs to invest in innovative 
and lucrative projects to drive employment and growth in a number of important industries. For 
banks to increase their SME lending, a novel framework is proposed regarding lending 
techniques and lenders’ feasibilities to finance SMEs in Pakistan. By adopting progressive 
lending techniques which bode well with the modern financing needs of SMEs at large, banks 
(without compromising on risk and return) can do more in order to address SME credit 
constraints. In order to make SMEs engines to growth, adequate financing is necessary. As 
availability/unavailability of sustained credit can make SMEs grow/go as engines to economic 
growth.  
Currently, as banks are reluctant to opt for these progressive lending techniques, efforts are 
required to soften banks’ skepticism about SME lending in the near future. Since, SBP (after 
declaring SME a priority sector) is spearheading appreciable efforts to promote SME finance, it 
should lead this drive by facilitating banks to adopt progressive lending techniques that are 
essential to design innovative products to target on SMEs. SBP may call on banks through 
awareness sessions, expert to banker talks, and joint capacity building ventures to improve SME 
credit. Banks that aggressively venture in SME financing may be incentivized by allowing some 
relief in CAR. Furthermore, by venturing in SME sector, banks may additionally gain from the 
SBP refinance schemes. Adoption of these techniques can be self-motivating, as banks are 
forgoing handsome profits that can be reaped otherwise by deploying the excess liquidity in 
SME financing. 
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